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DICTA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1961
WITNESSES - COMPETENCY - HUSBAND AND WIFE
- COMPELLING TESTIMONY IN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
James Ivey Wyatt was convicted in a federal district court for
knowingly transporting a woman in interstate commerce for the
purpose of prostitution in violation of the White Slave Traffic Act.'
Subsequent to the date of the offense but prior to the trial, he
married the victim. At the trial the prosecution called his wife as a
witness against him, but she claimed the privilege of not testifying
against her husband. Over objection the trial court compelled her to
testify. Held, a prosecution under the Mann Act constituted an
exception to the common law rule ordinarily permitting a party to
exclude the adverse testimony of his or her spouse, and in such a
prosecution the witness, who was both victim and defendant's wife,
could be compelled to testify against him. Wyatt v. United States,
362 U.S. 525 (1960).
Before considering the admissibility of the wife's testimony, it
is necessary to distinguish between the general privilege prohibiting
testimony by one spouse against the other, and the special privilege
as to confidential communications. The latter seems widely recog-
nized and approved in this country 2 while the former, although
recognized except where modified by statutes or limited by excep-
tions,3 has been strongly criticized because of its obscure origin,
uncertain rationale, and unfortunate results in limiting the judicial
search for truth.
4
The federal courts have consistently applied the common law
rule that neither spouse may testify against the other where one is
accused of a crime. 5 Therefore, in Stein v. Bowman,6 one of the
earliest Supreme Court decisions, where the wife was called as a
witness to prove that her husband had committed perjury, the
Court stated, inter alia, that neither husband nor wife could be a
witness for or against the other; that this rule was subject to some
exceptions as where one spouse commits an offense against the
other; and that this rule rested upon considerations of family
peace.
7
The Court's position in Stein v. Bowman was reaffirmed and
received further support in Graves v. United States.8 However, in
Funk v. United States9 the Court held that in a federal court the
wife of the defendant on trial for a criminal offense was a compe-
tent witness in his behalf. The Court rested its decision on the
ground that the exclusion had been based on interest, and now that
the defendant was allowed to testify in his own behalf there was
no reason for refusing to permit his wife to also testify for him. 0
1 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
2 8 Wigrnore, Evidence 1§ 2332-2341 (3rd. ed. 1940).
3 Ibid.
4 United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1007-08 (1943).
5 38 Va. L. Rev. 359, 368 (1952).
6 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209 (1839).
7 Id. at 221.
8 150 U.S. 118 (1893).
9 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
10 Id. at 381.
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In a footnote to the principal case," the Court indicates the inter-
pretation it has placed on the Funk case by saying: "Funk v. United
States, supra, abolished for the federal courts the disqualification or
incompetence of the spouse as a witness, thus establishing the ad-
missibility of his or her testimony, and leaving the question one of
privilege only."1 2
In the process of adopting the common law rule of incompe-
tency, which is now defined as a privilege, the federal courts also
adopted the exception known as "necessity.' 3 This exception em-
bodies a class of cases which at common law was narrowly con-
strued to be "personal wrongs" done to the spouse, i.e., "crimes
against the other.
1 4
The narrow limits, within which the exception applied, have
been broadened by legislative action. In 1887, Congress made it
permissible for a spouse to testify in cases where the defendant
spouse was prosecuted in the federal courts for bigamy, polygamy,
or unlawful cohabitation. 5 In 1917, a statute aimed at preventing
the importation of aliens for immoral purposes was enacted, and the
testimony of either spouse against the other was made admissible
and competent in prosecutions thereunder. 6 In neither of these
legislative enactments was any mention made of compelling the
spouse to testify.
With the passage of the Mann Act 17 in 1910, making it a federal
offense to transport a female in interstate commerce for immoral
purposes, several cases involving the "necessity" exception arose.
Often in these cases the testimony of the female transported was
necessary for a conviction, and in many instances the female turned
out to be the defendant's wife.
In one of the first cases to arise, Johnson v. United States,"8
the court held that a violation of the Act was not such a "personal
wrong" against the wife as would bring the testimony within the
exception.'9 At approximately the same time as the Johnson case,
the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in deciding that violations
11 Wyatt v. Un~ted States, 362 U.S. 525, 528 n.4 (1960).
12 While the Funk case, supro note 9, specifically establishes only the competency of the spouse
to testify for the accused, this statement by the Court is indicative of the later view taken by the
federal courts that the question is no longer one of competency but of privilege.
13 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra, note 3, § 2239.
14 Ibid.
15 28 U.S.C. ; 633 (1946).
16 39 Stat. 878 (1917), reenacted as 66 Stat. 230, 8 U.S.C. §1328 (1952).
17 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
18 221 Fed. 250 (8th Cir. 1915).
19 174 F.2d 833 (8th Cir 1949).
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of the Act were within the privilege, said that the term "personal
injury" was not confined to acts of personal violence, but might
include torts against the wife or a serious moral wrong against
her.
20
The initial conflict between the Courts of Appeals of the 8th
and 9th Circuits presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
intervene, but it did not. Subsequently, the Courts of Appeals of
the 2nd Circuit,2 1 the 5th Circuit 2 2 the 10th Circuit, 23 and several
district courts24 have supported the view that cases involving viola-
tions of the Mann Act were within the exception and have allowed
the wife to testify against her husband.
It is interesting to note that in every one of the cases the wife
has testified voluntarily, and the only objection interposed has been
that of the defendant-spouse. His privilege of excluding the adverse
testimony of his spouse fails because of the "necessity" exception.
The interesting question then arises: Does the marital witness also
have a privilege, to wit, refusing to testify?
In Hawkins v. United States, 25 the Government urged the Court
to rule that the privilege resided in the witness only. In refusing to
do so, the Court rejected any distinction between voluntary and
compelled testimony, and reaffirmed its position that where the
crime was not against the other spouse the defendant could exclude
his spouse's adverse testimony.2 6 This decision supports Professor
Wigmore's view that the husband-wife privilege is a dual one, resid-
ing in both the spouses.
2 7
The law had reached this point when the principal case arose.
The Court specifically affirmed the view that in most instances the
privilege resides in both the party and the witness. 28 It also made
clear that it was not holding that in all cases where the party's
privilege is lost because of the "necessity" exception the witness'
privilege is also lost, but rather: "It is a question in each case, or
in each category of cases, whether, in light of the reason which has
led to a refusal to recognize the party's privilege, the witness should
be held compellable.
'29
The Court, therefore, decided that in cases involving the Mann
Act, as a matter of public policy and in order to facilitate the legis-
lative intent embodied in the act, the witness-wife would not be
allowed to voluntarily make the choice whether or not to testify
against her husband. It felt that a man who could influence a
woman to the extent that she would prostitute herself could also
influence her to the point where she would marry him and refuse
to testify against him. This same line of reasoning was applied to
20 Cohen v. United States, 214 Fed. 23, 29 (9th Cir. 1914).
21 United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
22 Denning v. United States, 247 Fed. 463 (5th Cir. 1918).
23 Hayes v. United States, 168 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948).
24 Wilhoit v. Hiatt, 60 F. Supp. 664 (M.D. Pa. 1945); United States v. Williams, 55 F. Supp. 375
(D . Minn. 1944).
25 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
26 There are three significant items in this case. First, the woman transported across state lines
was not, and did not become tho defendant's wife. Secondly, although there was some doubt, the
defendant's wife did not obiect to testifying. Thirdly, there was no evidence to show that the de-
defendant had sexual relations with the transported female; hod there been, the Court might have
found that this was a crime against the wife and therefore within the exception.
27 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2241 (3rd ed. 1940).
28 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 529 (1960).
29 Ibid.
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the defendant's argument that there was no basis for the "necessity"
exception where the marriage occurred after the date of the offense.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in a dissenting opinion,30 concurred
with the majority's reasoning but disagreed with their conclusions.
He felt that there was no congressional support for the Court's deci-
sion, and that without it this decision represented an intrusion into
what was essentially a legislative area. He states: "It is more prop-
erly Congress' business, not ours, to place comparative values upon
the quest for facts in the judicial process as against the safe-guard-
ing of the marriage relationship .... -31 The dissent also pointed out
that under section 132832 the testimony of the spouse is made ad-
missible and competent, but not compulsory.
33
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gives to
the federal courts the right to interpret the common law in the light
of "reason and experience." In the instant case, the Court did
exactly that. Finding little or no authority in either the common
law or congressional acts, the Court exercised its power in a very
limited area to reach a just and logical result. It is difficult to
conceive of a more vicious offense than that of inducing a woman
to prostitute herself for the benefit of another, and the crime takes
on an added repugnancy when the female is the wrong-doer's wife.
On the grounds of public policy and morality the decision in the
Wyatt case should receive approval as an effective method of cur-
tailing these offenses.
George M. McClure III.
QUO WARRANTO
The unsuccessful candidates for offices in an unincorporated
labor union local asked the district attorney to bring an action
under the Rule of Civil Procedure' which abolishes the ancient writ
of quo warranto and allows a civil action against officers allegedly
elected through use of unfair election procedures and in violation of
the organization's constitution. When the district attorney refused
the unsuccessful candidates brought their own action as permitted
by the rule. Held: Judgment for defendants affirmed. The action
was not properly brought because quo warranto applies only to
public, not private, offices. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 357
P. 2d 352 (Colo. 1960).
Quo warranto is traditionally viewed as a proceeding to test
a party's right to a public office or franchise.2 It is an extraordinary
and highly prerogative writ,3 warranted only when a wrong against
30 With whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas joined.
31 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 535 (1960).
32 66 Stat. 230 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1328 (1952).
33 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 538 (1960).
1 Cala. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(3) provides: "Special forms of pleadings and writs in ... quo war-
ranto . . . are hereby abolished. In the following cases relief may be obtained by appropriate action
or by an appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in these rules:
"... (3) When any person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any office or
franchise. The district attorney . . . may . . . bring an action against such person in the name of the
people of the state, but if the district attorney declines so to do, it may be brought upon the rela-
tion and complaint of any person . . . . When such an action is brought against a defendant alleged
to usurp, intrude into, or unlawfully hold or exercise any public office, civil or, military, or any
franchise it shall be given precedence over other civil actions .... "
2 2 Spelling, Extraordinary Relief in Equity and At Law § 1765 (1893).
3 People ex rel. v. Blake, 128 Colo. 111,260 P.2d 592 (1953).
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